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SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
CONGLOMERATE GROWTH
PETER AscH*
MATITYAHU MARCUS* *

INTRODUCTION

Although conglomerate growth is no longer a new issue in economics
and public policy, our understanding of the phenomenon and its implications is far from complete. The conglomerate finn, whose activities extend
over various markets, occupies no comfortable place in orthodox economic
theory; and empirical evidence on the behavior of such firms is sketchy.
At a more mundane level, even the definition of "conglomerateness"
presents difficulties. Conglomerate growth usually is defined as growth that
is neither horizontal nor vertical; a conglomerate merger, e.g., is one in
which the acquiring and acquired firms are neither competitors nor in a
customer-supplier relationship. Unfortunately this distinction is sometimes
less meaningful than it appears.1 Even in obvious cases, where we are certain
that growth is neither horizontal nor vertical, the "degree" of conglomerateness may appear to vary. The Federal Trade Commission, for example,
termed Procter 8c Gamble's acquisition of Clorox a "product extension"
merger rather than a conglomerate, reasoning that some relationship existed
between the companies' activities, albeit non-horizontal and non-vertical.
The fundamental economic issue is whether distinctions such as the
above are material. That is, does growth of firms carry different implications
for performance and competition if it is conglomerate rather than horizontal
or vertical; and does the degree of conglomerateness similarly affect our expectations? It is these questions to which this paper is most broadly addressed.
THE GROWTH OF FIRMS

The importance of understanding the processes and determinants of
firms' growth in studies of market power and the evolution of monopolies
is generally recognized. Indeed, any discussion of changes in industry concentration is implicitly a discussion of growth patterns. Rising concentration
means that large firms are growing relatively fast; declining concentration
means that small firms are growing relatively fast.
* Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers College. A.B., Oberlin College, 1959; Ph.D.,
Princeton University, 1963. Formerly Economist, U.S. Department of Justice, 1963-1964.
** Associate Professor of Economics and Chairman, Livingston College, Rutgers
University. A.B., Brooklyn College, 1959; Ph.D., Brown University, 1963.
1 For example, is a merger between firms producing the same product in different
geographic areas, horizontal or conglomerate? A case in point is United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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Conglomerate expansion, whether it is accomplished internally or externally (by merger), is simply one form of the general phenomenon of firm
growth, and it will be therefore useful to note briefly the major factors
behind the growth of firms. 2
The most often-cited factor behind the growth of firms is the desire of
under-sized firms to reach an optimal scale of operation. At the larger size,
the firm hopes to realize various economies in one or more of its activities
(production, marketing, finance or management), and thereby realize higher
profits. Whether economies of scale are in fact continuously available to
growing firms - as managements often believe - is doubtful; studies of
optimal size have shown that, typically, economies of scale are realized at
sizes far below that of the largest existing firms.
A second factor of considerable importance is the desire of firms to
maintain their market share. Since the markets for most products increase
as population and per-capita income grow, the firm that wishes to retain its
market share will have to grow in absolute size.
Some economists also believe that the government's taxation policy,
favoring capital gains over ordinary income, is encouraging corporations to
utilize their retained earnings for expansion, rather than paying dividends.
This factor has been particularly emphasized in discussions of conglomerate
growth since, as we point out below, the presumption of growth for production efficiency is absent in firms with unrelated products.
CONGLOMERATES:

SOME EXISTING VIEWS

Consider a given group of firms and a specified pattern of expansion
(e.g., all firms grow at the same rate, or some grow faster than others). The
pertinent question is whether the initial degree of conglomerateness and the
proportion of expansion that is conglomerate, are likely to influence market
behavior. There are several possible answers to this question, some of which
have been widely discussed in the literature.
A. In one view, horizontal and perhaps vertical growth carry implications that are absent in the conglomerate case. Specifically, there may be
advantages that accrue to horizontally and vertically expanding firms. If the
conglomerate lacks these advantages, there may be a sense in which it is less
important for public competition policy than the older avenues of growth.
This position is tied closely to the notion that firm behavior is a function of its power within the market. Market or monopoly power refers to
the ability of firms to influence the terms at which they supply commodities.
Traditionally, it has been inferred or measured by examination of the firm's
size within the market (i.e., its market share), the closeness of substitute
commodities, and the likelihood of new entry. At one extreme, firms are so
The reader who wishes to pursue this aspect more fully might consult the works of
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1967); E. PENROSE, THE THEORIES OF
GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1966).
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numerous and small relative to the market that they exert no control; such
a market is purely competitive. At the other, there is only one firm confronted by no close substitutes or potential competitors; this is pure monopoly. In between lie a numberless group of possibilities representing different
states of competition.
In this view, horizontal growth clearly implies some alteration in competitive conditions if it alters the relative size (and perhaps the number) of
finns in the market. Conglomerate growth, however, can carry no such implication. It simply does not affect those conditions which determine a firm's
power within any defined market. The status of vertical growth is a bit less
clear. Vertical expansion initially does not alter numbers, market shares,
substitutes, or the potential for entry. Yet it may imply some market foreclosure (of suppliers from customers or vice versa) and increased efficiency.
Either of these results suggests that the firm which expands vertically may
increase its specific market power in the future.
Professors Jesse W. Markham 3 and George J. Stigler 4 have both expounded a part of the general argument that conglomerate growth may not
occupy the same status as growth in other directions. Stigler suggests that
the power of a conglomerate firm is simply the sum of its power in specific
markets; and that to calculate it otherwise is to argue that the whole exceeds
the sum of the parts. Markham, noting that a conglomerate firm which is
powerless in each of its markets cannot somehow be powerful overall, concludes that "conglomerateness and nothing more raises no public policy
issu e. . . .,5
B. A second view argues that although the conglomerate firm may lack
the advantages accruing to vertical or horizontal integration, it possesses a
different set of advantages. The most complete and familiar exposition of
this argument is to be found in a 1955 paper by Corwin D. Edwards. 6 The
advantages include: easy access to capital, the ability to employ superior
factors of production and to obtain factors at favorable terms, the services
of a full-time legal staff, mutual back-scratching with other firms, and the
capacity to "outbid, outspend or outlose" other firms at any time it chooses
Recent discussions of conglomerates have focused upon factors suggested by
the last two advantages: reciprocal buying and so-called conglomerate
power -the
ability to subsidize some activities from others.
The argument with respect to reciprocity is quite simple. Reciprocal
purchasing occurs whenever firms confront each other as both buyer and
seller, each stating in effect, "I will buy from you if you also buy from me."

3 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 70 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1269-80 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
4 Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 178-84 (1955).
5 1965 Hearings at 1271.
6 Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION &
PRICE POLIcY 331 (G. Stigler ed. 1955).
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Conglomerate firms by their very nature are likely to encounter more such
situations than their less diversified counterparts. Thus it is the conglomerate which is most prone to "lock up" sources of supply and demand, in a
fashion that bears some similarity both to vertical foreclosure and to tying
and exclusive dealing arrangements.
The argument with respect to conglomerate power is that diversified
firms can accept low profits in a particular area, in effect subsidizing it out of
returns from its more profitable operations. This ability to behave suboptimally in some market(s) is an important competitive advantage, for if a
conglomerate firm cuts prices in one of its markets to a level that implies less
than maximum profits, its competitors may be compelled either to follow
the price cuts or, if they continue to charge higher prices, to give up market
shares. In either case competitors are disadvantaged unless they too can subsidize the unprofitable market from other areas. Subsidization implies
greater "staying power" in such competitive struggles, and may also effectively insulate the conglomerate from predatory (or even active) price competition by its rivals.
C. A third position on the role of conglomerates, based upon objections
to certain points in the first two, argues, in effect, that neither market power,
narrowly defined, nor conglomerateness, provides a full explanation of the
behavior of firms.7 The argument that a firm's behavior can be attributed
solely to its market power in the traditional sense, may be inadequate in two
distinct but related ways. The first difficulty is simply that the usual measures of market power may be deficient. Market shares are perhaps the
primary index of such power, yet they ignore other factors. Should we be
prepared to say, for example, that two firms with equal market shares really
possess the same market power if one is backed by vast resources elsewhere
and the other is not? The second objection to the market power argument
is that it is tied closely to the profit-maximizing model of the single-product
firm; as such, it may be inadequate to describe the behavior of multi-product
firms which, quite "rationally," may choose to act "sub-optimally" in some
markets at some times.
If market power alone cannot completely describe the position and
behavior of firms, so too may conglomerateness alone fail to do so. The
commonly mentioned advantages of conglomerate firms may in fact have
little to do with the conglomeration. For example, the full-time legal office
which many large conglomerates enjoy is really a function of their absolute
size; large horizontal and vertical companies also have their own internal
"law firms," and there is no reason to suspect that the number of markets
in which the company operates will significantly affect its ability to establish
or utilize such an arrangement. Similarly, a firm's ability to purchase factors
of production at favorable terms would seem to be much more a function of
either absolute size or specific market power, than it is of conglomerateness.
7For the elements of this argument, see 1965 Hearings passim.

CONGLOMERATE GROWTH

In all likelihood, such ability relates to the fact that the firm is an important
customer of its factor suppliers. Once again, this need not have anything to
do with the number of markets in which the firm operates; it depends rather
upon the amounts that the firm is prepared to purchase.
In the case of reciprocity and market power, the argument is less clear,
and will be considered in greater detail below. What is clear even here, however, is that the ability of the conglomerate to act in certain ways is intimately entwined with its absolute size, and perhaps with its relative size
(market share) as well. It is no accident that the power of conglomerate firms
is always discussed in terms of the large conglomerate. No one has suggested,
for example, that a small but diversified firm is likely to engage in extensive
reciprocal dealing; or that such a firm can, by virtue of subsidization, drive
larger rivals from the market.
The third position on conglomerate growth has thus far been defined
only in negative terms: it is not either of the first two positions. The position
is indeed a rather vague one, but it does imply the following positive statements: both market power and conglomerateness may make a difference to
the behavior of firms; and it also may be that absolute size of firm is significant. To the extent that absolute size matters, it is the fact of firm growth
rather than its direction in which we ought to be most interested.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONGLOMERATENESS:

SOME OBSERVATIONS

The arguments discussed above indicate that there is no such thing as

a unified theory of the conglomerate firm. Questions about the behavior of
conglomerates are most unlikely to be settled deductively. It is possible,
however, to define further some of the pertinent questions, and to suggest
what some possible answers may ultimately turn out to be.

A. Efficiency
Consider three firms of equal absolute size, one purely horizontal, one
vertically integrated, and one conglomerate. In the case of the horizontal
firm, there is always a presumption that it may have attained its size because
of economies of scale. If goods can be produced more efficiently at large scale,
firms will tend to grow to attain this scale. 8 Similarly, the vertically integrated firm may have reached its present size for reasons of efficiency;
perhaps integrated operations allow production to occur at lower unit resource costs than separated operations.9 Can efficiencies justify the size of the
conglomerate firm? Neither the economies of scale nor the economies of

integration arguments apply here. Of course the conglomerate may enjoy
managerial economies, but this is equally true of the horizontal and vertical
firms.
s This is not to imply that horizontal firms of any given size are necessarily efficient;

size may be attained for other, less desirable, reasons.
9The same caveat applies to vertically integrated firms of any given size.
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It would thus appear that: (a) there are efficiency arguments that may
justify horizontal and vertical firms of some given size which cannot justify
conglomerate firms of the same size; and (b) there are no efficiency justifications for the conglomerate firm which do not also apply to the horizontal
and vertical firms of the same size. Indeed, the managerial efficiency argument may be stronger for horizontal and vertical firms since management
is more specialized for the narrower range of activities undertaken by such
firms.
Efficiency is clearly a social desideratum; it is better to produce more
goods with given resources or to use up fewer resources in producing a
given quantity of goods. On this count conglomerates may be socially less
useful than vertical and horizontal firms, abstracting from size. Whether
this is an important consideration, however, is essentially an empirical
question. One way to test this proposition is to establish the relatedness of
0
lines acquired by the conglomerate.' For instance, if an apparel firm
acquires a toy-making firm with the objective of utilizing its plant and
labor force more fully during the entire year, the move cannot be presumed
socially undesirable.
B. Restrictive Behavior
Is the conglomerate firm more likely to engage in restrictive, or outright
anti-competitive acts, than its horizontal and vertical counterparts? Once
again it is necessary to abstract from absolute and relative size, and to speak
in terms of companies that are equivalent in these respects.
1. Reciprocity. The argument that conglomerate firms are prone to
reciprocal dealing is simply an argument of opportunities. Since these firms
buy and sell in many markets, they are more likely to find other firms who
are both customers and suppliers. If this were the end of the matter, the
merits of the argument would be clear. Consider again, however, firms of
equal absolute size, in this case one conglomerate and one horizontal. It is
true that the conglomerate is more likely to encounter situations in which
reciprocity is possible. But the more diversified it is at a given size, the
smaller it is in each of its (buying and selling) functions. The horizontal
firm of the same size may deal in fewer areas, but it is a quantitatively
larger entity, in each of these. Reciprocal dealing is of course a matter of
opportunity, but opportunity, while a necessary condition, may not be sufficient; the more "important" firms are to each other, the more likely they
are to reciprocate. And it is possible that the conglomerate which is "spread
thin" over many activities will not be a sufficiently important buyer or
seller in each, to induce reciprocal agreements.
The issue is thus one of weighing two conflicting tendencies: the
conglomerate of a given size has more potential reciprocity situations; the
10 For a pertinent discussion of relatedness, see J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
AND MARKET COMPETITION (1967).
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horizontal firm of the same size has fewer opportunities, but may be a more
desirable reciprocity partner in those fewer instances. It is not relevant to
argue that the large conglomerate is more likely to engage in reciprocity
than the small horizontal firm; while this may be quite true, the significant
difference is firm size. For specified sizes, it is not clear that conglomeration
will result in more reciprocal dealing. The question once again can be
settled only by an appeal to empirical evidence.
2. Predatory behavior. The conglomerate power argument states that
subsidization can be used to place rivals at a disadvantage in specific
markets. We consider here the specific example of predatory price policies.
If two firms in the same market are of different size, the issue is a simple
one. The larger firm by virtue of its resources is more likely to pursue
predatory policies successfully than the smaller firn, regardless of the degree
of conglomerateness in each. Even if we think in terms of subsidization, the
large horizontal firm is not precluded from a predatory course. Such
companies may cut prices in certain geographic areas, sustaining them by
profits in other areas. Indeed, large horizontal firms typically produce a
"variety" of products. The products tend to be substitutes for each other,
such as a Buick and a Pontiac, but this need not prevent the company
from taking low profits in one line in order to discomfit competitors.
The fact that large firms can cut price more easily than small firms tells
us nothing about the effect of conglomerateness, however. Assume two firms,
A and B, of equal absolute size. Firm A sells exclusively in the widget
industry, while B has 10 percent of its sales in widgets and 90 percent elsewhere. From the standpoint of "staying power" the firms are equally
matched; they have the same resources with which to sustain subnormal
widget profits if necessary. The fact that A is horizontal and B is diversified
may, however, imply an important difference. This difference lies in the
familiar proposition that diversification reduces risk. Although A and B are
in one respect equal, B, the conglomerate firm, stands to lose less if it
pursues predatory pricing and fails, than does A. Firm A has all its eggs
in one basket; a losing price competition would finish it. Firm B, however,
has 90 percent of its "eggs" in other "baskets." If it loses a competition
with A, its negative payoff is limited.
There is, of course, another side to the reduction of risk. Whereas
diversification restricts B's maximum loss (and non-diversification enlarges
A's maximum loss), it also restricts B's maximum gain from competing and
winning (as nondiversification enlarges A's maximum gain). On pure
profit-maximizing grounds, then, it is not clear that B's conglomerateness
gives him an advantage vis-A-vis A. If he cuts price and loses, his loss will
be relatively small, but so will his gains if he cuts price and wins.
Suppose, however, that large firms act partially as risk averters. This is
a plausible supposition supported by much casual evidence. In this case,
conglomerate B is much more likely than specialist A to begin price cutting.
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Extending the example, we may say that conglomerate B is more likely to
pursue any predatory practice than is specialist A, given some specified
probabilities of success and failure. There is, then, an important sense in
which conglomerateness itself may influence a firm's behavior.
3. Entry. The risk aversion argument also suggests that conglomerates
are more likely to enter some markets in which there is an abnormal risk
of failure. Entry may demand a certain amount of capital and thus preclude
small firms from coming into some markets. But if risk is a factor, a
conglomerate firm may be more willing to enter than a specialized firm of
the same size because the conglomerate is already protected (to some degree)
against risk. If it enters the new market and fails, it is still likely to receive
profits from its other independent activities. The specialist may have other
resources if it enters and fails; but because these resources are themselves
specialized, it can enter the new market only at some peril. If it fails in
the new market, and its other specialized activities also happen to "turn
sour," it faces grave difficulty. The general proposition implicit here is
clear: the more diversified a firm is, the more likely it is to undertake risky
activities, including entry into risky markets. This element, working as it
does to reduce the concentration of market power in the hands of older
firms, can indeed be regarded as a positive aspect of conglomerate growth.
4. Technology. While the importance of technological innovation on
firms' growth and profitability has long been acknowledged, its likely impact
upon the pattern of growth (conglomerate or otherwise) appears to have
been neglected. These results are essentially due to the inherent uncertainties
of investment in research and development. First, many research projects
fail to produce a product or process which can be used commercially. 1 ' The
second uncertainty in research and development activities is that their yield
might not fall within the product range of the firm, and hence might be
unusable. (The research lab which, while attempting to come up with a
better insecticide, discovers a new drug, is not infrequent.) Indeed, the more
basic is the research done, the higher is the likely payoff in the event of
success, but less predictable is the direction of results. The conglomerate
firm with diverse products and production processes is thus better equipped
to exploit the products of a broad-based research and development department. One way to test the validity of this hypothesis is to see whether the
conglomerate group displays a higher proportion of technologically oriented
firms with large and active research labs.
CONCLUSIONS: SOME POLICY OBSERVATIONS

A judgment about the social desirability of conglomerate growth is, at
present, purely speculative and uncertain. While there is no presumption
11 Richard R. Nelson, citing a management study notes, that 60 percent was the
median failure rate and 50 percent was the minimum failure rate among research and
development projects. Nelson, The Economics of Invention; A Survey of the Literature,
32 J. Bus. 114 (1959).
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that large conglomerate firms realize socially desirable economies of scale,
we have seen that conglomerate firms are more likely to enter risky industries
and participate more heavily in basic scientific research. Their price behavior is much less certain: while competitive (and predatory) price cutting
is less onerous for a diversified firm, the incentives to engage in such price
wars are considerably diminished.
A speculative balance sheet of the likely consequences of conglomerates
is of little use in itself at the present time. If we are to expand our knowledge significantly we must undertake to test empirically many of the possibilities, implicit and explicit, in the above, as well as in other discussions.
Indeed, some of the hypotheses formulated above (on entry, price-behavior,
research orientation) can perhaps be tested with available data and should
have high priority in any future research.
Important as empirical analysis is for long run policy formulation, we
clearly recognize that public officials cannot in the meantime avoid dealing
with immediate issues. In this regard it is our feeling that, based on highly
imperfect knowledge, conglomerate mergers ought to be treated with
caution. The admonition of Richard B. Heflebower' 2 several years ago is
pertinent: a stringent anti-merger policy in general is reversible; a weak
policy, given our traditional reluctance to break tip established concerns, is
not. Until conglomerate behavior is examined empirically the economy
might well benefit from a risk-aversion policy of its own, in which conglomerate growth is considered no more (or less) benign than horizontal or
vertical growth.
12 Heflebower, Corporate Mergers: Policy and Economic Analysis, 77 Q. J. ECON. 5375S (1965).

